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INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 155045

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [BM](#)

SUBJECT: REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY SPECIAL ADVISOR  
GAMBARI

Classified By: IO Acting A/S James Warlick, Reasons  
1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: On November 13 Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari will report to the UN Security Council on his November 3-8 trip to Burma. USUN is instructed to draw from points in para 4 for its intervention on the Gambari briefing/report and public comments afterwards, highlighting U.S. support for Aung San Suu Kyi's statement, noting that her position has not changed, and stressing the need for the Burmese regime to begin a meaningful and time-bound dialogue on a peaceful transition to civilian democratic rule. As soon as P3 negotiations in New York are completed, USUN is instructed to forward to the Department the text of a Security Council Presidential Statement (PRST) for consideration later next week. Instructions on the PRST will be sent septel once text has been received and circulated in the Department. End Summary and Action request.

12. (C) BACKGROUND: The Burmese regime's handling of UN Special Advisor Ibrahim Gambari's November 3-8 visit to Burma was disappointing. Gambari was kept in the remote capital of Nay Pyi Taw for almost the whole visit and the regime strictly controlled his itinerary. Senior General Than Shwe, who had met with Gambari in the past, refused to meet with him. Instead, Gambari met with the Prime Minister (Burma's third-ranking general) and other officials, and hand-picked representatives of the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and ethnic minority groups. Gambari was allowed to meet once with members of the National League for Democracy and once with Aung San Suu Kyi shortly before his departure. He was not, however, allowed to meet with other detainees or with Buddhist monks involved in the recent protests. During his visit, the Burmese state media announced that the proposal of a tripartite dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and Gambari is "premature." Gambari told foreign diplomats that he would be allowed to return, hoped to do so in 2-3 weeks, and was pressing the regime for a date. Several foreign diplomats usually sympathetic to the regime told the U.S. Charge in Rangoon that they felt the way the regime managed the visit had been a personal snub to Gambari and a humiliation for the UN.

13. (C) BACKGROUND (cont'd): Following his visit to Burma, the UN and Mr. Gambari released a statement by Aung San Suu Kyi expressing support for the UN "good offices" mission, her willingness to engage with the leadership of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and her desire that preliminary discussions give way soon to a "meaningful and time-bound dialogue." On November 9, Aung San Suu Kyi met with her colleagues in the National League for Democracy (NLD) for the first time in three years. End of background.

14. (U) Begin points.

-- The United States deeply appreciates the efforts of Special Advisor Gambari and his team. Media reporting around the world testified to Mr. Gambari's efforts to fulfill the objectives laid down by this Council in its October 11 PRST, namely "to create the necessary conditions for a genuine dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all concerned parties and ethnic groups in order to achieve an inclusive national reconciliation with the direct support of the United Nations."

-- The United States welcomes the statement by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi released by Mr. Gambari on November 8. We echo her thanks to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon for his efforts to promote national reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Burma. We fully support her continued willingness and commitment to engage in a "meaningful and time-bound dialogue with the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council)," and reiterate her call that this dialogue begin as early as possible.

-- Unfortunately, Senior General Than Shwe and the SPDC continue to resist such a dialogue. In fact, the SPDC announced through the state media on November 6 that tripartite talks involving the SPDC, Aung San Suu Kyi and Mr. Gambari would be "premature." In reality, these talks are long overdue and have been called for repeatedly by Burma's neighbors, by the broader international community, and, most recently, by this Council in its October 11 Presidential Statement. To fulfill its obligations to this body, the regime should immediately begin this dialogue. Failure to do so would require further action by this Council.

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-- We call on those countries with influence over Burma, particularly its neighbors, to persuade Burma's ruling generals to begin the inclusive dialogue on the peaceful transition to democracy that Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese people seek and the UN is prepared to facilitate.

-- It is incumbent upon the Security Council as well to continue its efforts to ensure that the SPDC does not simply continue to impose its so-called road map to democracy, which excludes Burma's democratic and ethnic minority groups from meaningful participation and which clearly lacks legitimacy, as evidenced by the recent massive protests. A peaceful transition to democracy will require a process that is shaped by, includes and is supported by all of the people of Burma.

-- The United States is pleased that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met with her fellow members of the National League for Democracy on November 9. This is a positive development, however small, that must be built upon. In her statement, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi noted that she must take into consideration "the interests and opinions of as broad a range of political organizations" in Burma as possible, particularly Burma's ethnic minorities. It is critical that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi be free to consult broadly in order to engage in meaningful dialogue with the SPDC.

-- It is unreasonable to expect that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will be able to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the Burmese generals while she is under house arrest and her movement and consultations are tightly controlled. If Than Shwe and his senior generals are committed to a genuine dialogue on transition to civilian democratic rule in Burma, the first step should be immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This is an essential step toward fulfilling the UNSC's call for the regime "to create the necessary conditions for a genuine dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all concerned parties and ethnic groups in order to achieve an inclusive national reconciliation with the direct support of the United Nations."

-- Than Shwe's decision not to meet with Mr. Gambari as he has in the past reflects a disturbing lack of commitment to working with the UN to promote the process of national

reconciliation. If the UN "good offices" mission is to be effective, the Burmese regime needs to allow Mr. Gambari to control his own itinerary and to meet with any person he deems relevant to his efforts. The generals themselves need to directly engage with Mr. Gambari, rather than trying to communicate through intermediaries or the media.

-- The United States fully supports the "good offices" mission and believes that this mechanism can facilitate the outcome that we all seek - a peaceful transition to a representative and responsible government in Burma. The Secretary General is clearly committed to the process, as is

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Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It is now time for Senior General Than Shwe and his regime to demonstrate that they are equally committed, by releasing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and beginning the meaningful and time-bound dialogue that she has called for, leading to transition and national reconciliation.

End points.

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